The COVID-19 pandemic has created a public health crisis. Because SARS-CoV-2 can spread from individuals with pre-symptomatic, symptomatic, and asymptomatic infections \[[@R1], [@R2], [@R3]\], the re-opening of societies and the control of virus spread will be facilitated by robust surveillance, for which virus testing will often be central. After infection, individuals undergo a period of incubation during which viral titers are usually too low to detect, followed by an exponential growth of virus, leading to a peak viral load and infectiousness, and ending with declining viral levels and clearance \[[@R4]\]. Given the pattern of viral load kinetics \[[@R4]\], we model surveillance effectiveness considering test sensitivities, frequency, and sample-to-answer reporting time. These results demonstrate that effective surveillance, including time to first detection and outbreak control, depends largely on frequency of testing and the speed of reporting, and is only marginally improved by high test sensitivity. We therefore conclude that surveillance should prioritize accessibility, frequency, and sample-to-answer time; analytical limits of detection should be secondary.

The reliance on testing as a means to safely reopen societies has placed a microscope on the analytical sensitivity of virus assays, with a gold-standard of quantitative real-time polymerase chain reaction (qPCR). These assays have analytical limits of detection that are usually within around 10^3^ viral RNA copies per ml (cp/ml) \[[@R5]\]. However, qPCR remains expensive and as a laboratory based assay often have sample-to-result times of 24--48 hours. New developments in SARS-CoV-2 diagnostics have the potential to reduce cost significantly, allowing for expanded testing or greater frequency of testing and can reduce turnaround time to minutes. These assays however largely do not meet the gold standard for analytical sensitivity, which has encumbered translation of these assays for widescale use \[[@R6]\].

Three features of the viral increase, infectivity, and decline during SARS-CoV-2 infection led us to hypothesize that there might be minimal differences in effective surveillance using viral detection tests of different sensitivities, such as RT-qPCR with a limit of detection (LOD) at 10^3^ cp/ml \[[@R5]\] compared to often cheaper or faster assays with higher limits of detection (i.e., around 10^5^ cp/ml) such as point-of-care nucleic acid LAMP and rapid antigen tests ([Figure 1A](#F1){ref-type="fig"}). First, since filtered samples collected from patients displaying less than 10^6^ N or E RNA cp/ml contain minimal or no measurable infectious virus \[[@R7], [@R8], [@R9]\], either class of test should detect individuals who are currently infectious. The absence of infectious particles at viral RNA concentrations *\<* 10^6^ cp/ml is likely due to (i) the fact that the N and E RNAs are also present in abundant subgenomic mRNAs, leading to overestimation of the number of actual viral genomes by \~100--1000X \[[@R10]\], (ii) technical artifacts of RT-PCR at Ct values *\>* 35 due to limited template \[[@R11],[@R12]\], and (iii) the production of non-infectious viral particles as is commonly seen with a variety of RNA viruses \[[@R13]\]. Second, during the exponential growth of the virus, the time difference between 10^3^ and 10^5^ cp/ml is short, allowing only a limited window in which only the more sensitive test could diagnose individuals. For qPCR, this corresponds to the time required during viral growth to go from Ct values of 40 to *\~*34. While this time window for SARS-CoV-2 is not yet rigorously defined, for other respiratory viruses such as influenza, and in ferret models of SARS-CoV-2 transmission, it is on the order of a day \[[@R14], [@R15]\]. Finally, high-sensitivity screening tests, when applied during the viral decline accompanying recovery, are unlikely to substantially impact transmission because such individuals detected have low, if any, infectiousness \[[@R10]\].

To examine how surveillance testing would reduce the average infectiousness of individuals, we first modeled the viral loads and infectiousness curves of 10,000 simulated individuals using the predicted viral trajectories of SARS-CoV-2 infections based on key features of latency, growth, peak, and decline identified in the literature ([Figure 1A](#F1){ref-type="fig"}; see [Methods](#SD1){ref-type="supplementary-material"}). Accounting for these within-host viral kinetics, we calculated what percentage of their total infectiousness would be removed by surveillance and isolation ([Figure 1B](#F1){ref-type="fig"}) with tests at LOD of 10^3^ and 10^5^, and at different frequencies. Here, infectiousness was taken to be proportional to the logarithm of viral load in excess of 10^6^ cp/ml (with alternative assumptions addressed in [Supplemental Materials](#SD1){ref-type="supplementary-material"}), consistent with the observation that pre-symptomatic patients are most infectious just prior to the onset of symptoms \[[@R4]\], and evidence that the efficiency of viral transmission coincides with peak viral loads, which was also identified during the related 2003 SARS outbreak \[[@R16], [@R17]\]. We considered that 20% of patients would undergo symptomatic isolation near their peak viral load if they had not been tested and isolated first, and 80% would have sufficiently mild or no symptoms such that they would not isolate unless they were detected by surveillance testing. This analysis demonstrated that there was little difference in averting infectiousness between the two classes of test. Dramatic reductions in total infectiousness of the individuals were observed by testing daily or every third day, *\~* 60% reduction when testing weekly, and *\<* 40% under biweekly testing ([Figure 1C](#F1){ref-type="fig"}). Because viral loads and infectiousness vary across individuals, we also analyzed the impact of different surveillance regimes on the distribution of individuals' infectiousness ([Figure 1D](#F1){ref-type="fig"}).

Above, we assumed that each infection was independent. To investigate the effects of surveillance testing strategies at the population level, we used simulations to monitor whether epidemics were contained or became uncontrolled, while varying the frequencies at which the test was administered, ranging from daily testing to testing every 14 days, and considering tests with LOD of 10^3^ and 10^5^, analogous to RT-qPCR and RT-LAMP / rapid antigen tests, respectively. We used two different epidemiological models to ensure that important observations were independent of the specific modeling approach. The first model is a previously described agent-based model with both within-household and age-stratified contact structure based on census microdata in a city representative of New York City \[[@R18]\], and initialized with 100 cases without additional external infections. The second model is a simple fully mixed model representing a population of 20,000, similar to a large university setting, with a constant rate of external infection approximately equal to one new import per day. Individual viral loads were simulated for each infection, and individuals who received a positive test result were isolated, but contact tracing and monitoring was not included to more conservatively estimate the impacts of surveillance alone \[[@R19], [@R20]\]. Model details and parameters are fully described in [Methods](#SD1){ref-type="supplementary-material"}.

We observed that a surveillance program administering either test with high frequency limited viral spread, measured by both a reduction in the reproductive number *R* ([Figures 2A](#F2){ref-type="fig"} and [B](#F2){ref-type="fig"}; see [Methods](#SD1){ref-type="supplementary-material"} for calculation procedure) and by the total infections that persisted in spite of different surveillance programs, expressed relative to no surveillance ([Figures 2C](#F2){ref-type="fig"} and [D](#F2){ref-type="fig"}). Testing frequency was found to be the primary driver of population-level epidemic control, with only a small margin of improvement provided by using a more sensitive test. Direct examination of simulations showed that with no surveillance or biweekly testing, infections were uncontrolled, whereas surveillance testing weekly with either LOD = 10^3^ or 10^5^ effectively attenuated surges of infections (examples shown in [Figure S1](#SD1){ref-type="supplementary-material"}).

The relationship between test sensitivity and the frequency of testing required to control outbreaks in both the fully mixed model and the agent-based model generalize beyond the examples shown in [Figure 2](#F2){ref-type="fig"} and are also seen at other testing frequencies and sensitivities. We simulated both models at LODs of 10^3^, 10^5^, and 10^6^, and for testing ranging from daily to every 14 days. For those, we measured each surveillance policy's impact on total infections ([Figure S2A](#SD1){ref-type="supplementary-material"} and [B](#SD1){ref-type="supplementary-material"}) and on *R* ([Figure S2C](#SD1){ref-type="supplementary-material"} and [D](#SD1){ref-type="supplementary-material"}). In [Figure 2](#F2){ref-type="fig"}, we modeled infectiousness as proportional to log~10~ of viral load. To address whether these finding are sensitive to this modeled relationship, we performed similar simulations with infectiousness proportional to viral load ([Figure S3](#SD1){ref-type="supplementary-material"}), or uniform above 10^6^/ml ([Figure S4](#SD1){ref-type="supplementary-material"}). We found that results were robust to these large variations in the modeled relationship between infectiousness and viral load.

An important variable in surveillance testing is the time between a test's sample collection and the reporting of a diagnosis. To examine how time to reporting affected epidemic control, we re-analyzed both the reduction in individuals' infectiousness, as well as the epidemiological simulations, comparing the results of instantaneous reporting (reflecting a rapid point-of-care assay), one day delay, and two day delay ([Figure 3A](#F3){ref-type="fig"} and [B](#F3){ref-type="fig"}). Delays in reporting dramatically decreased the reduction in infectiousness in individuals as seen by the total infectiousness removed ([Figure 3C](#F3){ref-type="fig"}), the distribution of infectiousness in individuals ([Figure 3D](#F3){ref-type="fig"}), or the dynamics of the epidemiological models ([Figure 4](#F4){ref-type="fig"}). This result was robust to the modeled relationship between infectiousness and viral load in both simulation models and for various test sensitivities and frequencies ([Figure S5](#SD1){ref-type="supplementary-material"}). These results highlight that delays in reporting lead to dramatically less effective control of viral spread and emphasize that fast reporting of results is critical in any surveillance testing. These results also reinforce the relatively smaller benefits of improved limits of detection.

Communities vary in their transmission dynamics, due to difference in rates of imported infections and in the basic reproductive number *R*~0~, both of which will influence the frequency and sensitivity with which surveillance testing must occur. We performed two analyses to illustrate this point. First, we varied the rate of external infection in our fully mixed model, and confirmed that when the external rate of infection is higher, more frequent surveillance is required to prevent outbreaks ([Figure S6A](#SD1){ref-type="supplementary-material"}). Second, we varied the reproductive number *R*~0~ between infected individuals in both models, and confirmed that at higher *R*~0~, more frequent surveillance is also required ([Figure S6B](#SD1){ref-type="supplementary-material"} and [C](#SD1){ref-type="supplementary-material"}). This may be relevant to institutions like college campuses or military bases wherein frequent classroom setting or dormitory living are likely to increase contact rates. Thus, the specific strategy for successful surveillance will depend on the current community infection prevalence and transmission rate.

Our results lead us to conclude that surveillance testing of asymptomatic individuals can be used to limit the spread of SARS-CoV-2. However, our findings are subject to a number of limitations. First, the sensitivity of a test may depend on factors beyond LOD, including manufacturer variation and improper clinical sampling \[[@R21]\], though the latter may be ameliorated by different approaches to sample collection, such as saliva-based testing \[[@R22]\]. Second, our model assumed that no individuals would refuse testing. Both refusal and sampling-driven sensitivity issues can be accounted for in estimates using a simple formula (see [Supplemental Text](#SD1){ref-type="supplementary-material"}), but a more sophisticated understanding of the relationship between sampling-driven sensitivity issues and viral load, for instance, would more accurately address this limitation. Finally, the exact performance differences between testing schemes will depend on whether our model truly captures viral kinetics and infectiousness profiles \[[@R4]\], particularly during the acceleration phase between exposure and peak viral load. Continued clarification of these within-host dynamics would increase the impact and value of this, and other \[[@R19], [@R20]\] modeling studies.

A critical point is that the requirements for surveillance testing are distinct from clinical testing. Clinical diagnoses target symptomatic individuals, need high accuracy and sensitivity, and are not limited by cost. Because they focus on symptomatic individuals, those individuals can isolate such that a diagnosis delay does not lead to additional infections. In contrast, results from the surveillance testing of asymptomatic individuals need to be returned quickly, since even a single day diagnosis delay compromises the surveillance program's effectiveness. Indeed, at least for viruses with infection kinetics similar to SARS-CoV-2, we find that speed of reporting is much more important than sensitivity, althoughmore sensitive testsare neverthelesssomewhat more effective.

The difference between clinical and surveillance testing highlights the need for additional tests to be approved and utilized for surveillance. Such tests should not be held to the same degree of sensitivity as clinical tests, in particular if doing so encumbers rapid deployment of faster cheaper SARS-CoV-2 assays. We suggest that the FDA, other agencies, or state governments, encourage the development and use of alternative faster and lower cost tests for surveillance purposes, even if they have poorer limits of detection. If the availability of point-of-care or self-administered surveillance tests leads to faster turnaround time or more frequent testing, our results suggest that they would have high epidemiological value.

Our modeling suggests that some types of surveillance will subject some individuals to unnecessary quarantine days. For instance, the infrequent use of a sensitive test will not only identify (i) those with a low viral load in the beginning of the infection, who must be isolated to limit viral spread, but (ii) those in the recovery period, who still have detectable virus or RNA but are below the infectious threshold \[[@R9], [@R10]\]. Isolating this second group of patients will have no impact on viral spread but will incur costs of isolation. The use of serology, repeat testing 24 or 48 hours apart, or some other test, to distinguish low viral load patients on the upslope of infection from those in the recovery phase could allow for more effective quarantine decisions.
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![Surveillance testing effectiveness depends on frequency.\
(A) An example viral load trajectory is shown with LOD thresholds of two tests, and a hypothetical positive test on day 6, two days after peak viral load. 20 other stochastically generated viral loads are shown to highlight trajectory diversity (light grey; see [Methods](#SD1){ref-type="supplementary-material"}). (B) Relative infectiousness for the viral load shown in panel A pre-test, totaling 31% (blue) and post-isolation, totaling 69% (black). (C) Surveillance programs using tests at LODs of 10^3^ and 10^5^ at frequencies indicated were applied to 10,000 individuals trajectories of whom 20% would undergo symptomatic isolation near their peak viral load if they had not been tested and isolated first. Total infectiousness removed during surveillance (colors) and self isolation (hatch) are shown for surveillance as indicated, relative to total infectiousness with no surveillance or self-isolation. (D) The impact of surveillance on the infectiousness of 100 individuals is shown for each surveillance program and no testing, as indicated, with each individual colored by test if their infection was detected during infectiousness (medians, black lines) or colored blue if their infection was missed by surveillance or detected positive *after* their infectious period (medians, blue lines). Units are arbitrary and scaled to the maximum infectiousness of sampled individuals.](nihpp-2020.06.22.20136309-f0001){#F1}

![Surveillance testing affects disease dynamics.\
Both the fully-mixed compartmental model (top row) and agent based model (bottom row) are affected by surveillance programs. (A, B) More frequent testing reduces the effective reproductive number *R*, shown as the percentage by which *R*~0~ is reduced, 100 *×* (*R*~0~ *− R*)*/R*~0~. Values of *R* were estimated from 50 independent simulations of dynamics (see [Methods](#SD1){ref-type="supplementary-material"}). (C, D) Relative to no testing (grey bars), surveillance suppresses the total number of infections in both models when testing every day or every three days, but only partially mitigates total cases for weekly or bi-weekly testing. Error bars indicate inner 95% quantiles of 50 independent simulations each.](nihpp-2020.06.22.20136309-f0002){#F2}

![Effectiveness of surveillance testing is compromised by delays in reporting.\
(A) An example viral load trajectory is shown with LOD thresholds of two tests, and a hypothetical positive test on day 6, but with results reported on day 8. 20 other stochastically generated viral loads are shown to highlight trajectory diversity (light grey; see [Methods](#SD1){ref-type="supplementary-material"}). (B) Relative infectiousness for the viral load shown in panel A pre-test (totaling 31%; blue) and post-test but pre-diagnosis (totaling 32%; green), and post-isolation (totaling 37%; black). (C) Surveillance programs using tests at LODs of 10^3^ and 10^5^ at frequencies indicated, and with results returned after 0, 1, or 2 days (indicated by small text beneath bars) were applied to 10,000 individuals trajectories of whom 20% were symptomatic and self-isolated after peak viral load if they had not been tested and isolated first. Total infectiousness removed during surveillance (colors) and self isolation (hatch) are shown, relative to total infectiousness with no surveillance or self-isolation. Delays substantially impact the fraction of infectiousness removed. (D) The impact of surveillance with delays in returning diagnosis of 0, 1, or 2 days (small text beneath axis) on the infectiousness of 100 individuals is shown for each surveillance program and no testing, as indicated, with each individual colored by test if their infection was detected during infectiousness (medians, black lines) or colored blue if their infection was missed by surveillance or diagnosed positive *after* their infectious period (medians, blue lines). Units are arbitrary and scaled to the maximum infectiousness of sampled individuals.](nihpp-2020.06.22.20136309-f0003){#F3}

![Delays in reporting decrease the epidemiological impact of surveillance-driven isolation.\
The effectiveness of surveillance programs are dramatically diminished by delays in reporting in both the fully-mixed compartmental model (top row) and agent based model (bottom row). (A, B) The impact of surveillance every day, 3 days, weekly, or biweekly, on the reproductive number *R*, calculated as 100 *×* (*R*~0~ *− R*)*/R*~0~, is shown for LODs 10^3^ and 10^5^ and delays of 0, 1, or 2 days (small text below axis). Values of *R* were estimated from 50 independent simulations of dynamics (see [Methods](#SD1){ref-type="supplementary-material"}). (C, D) Relative to no testing (grey bars), surveillance suppresses the total number of infections in both models when testing every day or every three days, but delayed results lead to only partial mitigation of total cases, even for testing every day or 3 days. Error bars indicate inner 95% quantiles of 50 independent simulations each.](nihpp-2020.06.22.20136309-f0004){#F4}
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